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A Reckless Response to Rape:  A Reply 
to Ayres and Baker 
Kimberly Kessler Ferzan* 
In a recent article in the University of Chicago Law Review, Professors 
Ian Ayres and Katharine Baker propose the crime of “reckless sexual conduct,” 
criminalizing unprotected first-encounter sexual intercourse.  The goals of this 
proposal are to combat the epidemic of sexually transmitted diseases by 
requiring condom use and to reduce acquaintance rape by “forcing” 
communication.  While the goals are admirable, the proposal is deeply flawed.  
As public health legislation, it is overinclusive, thereby punishing the morally 
innocent, and its conception of consent as an affirmative defense fundamentally 
misunderstands criminal responsibility.  As rape reform, which is arguably the 
true aim of the statute, the proposal is morally and constitutionally 
impermissible:  it punishes the innocent and improperly allocates the burden of 
proving consent to the defendant.  The proposed statute also distracts from rape 
reform by attempting to circumvent the critical normative questions about 
consent and offering a second-best solution in consent’s place.  Finally, the 
compromise verdicts that the authors seek, offered as a solution to the “sticky 
norms” problem, may ultimately undermine the seriousness of the very rapes 
the authors hope to prevent. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The rich and famous sometimes get away with murder.  And they also 
sometimes get away with rape.  Rape remains one of the most 
challenging areas of criminal law.  Defining what constitutes consent and 
ascertaining under what conditions consent is competent, knowing, and 
unforced present difficult normative questions.  And even when a rape, 
however defined, occurs, it still remains to be proven.  Through the 
cracks of doctrinal and evidentiary rules, many rapes go unpunished.  
Arguably, Kobe Bryant’s might have been such a case. 
There is often an outcry against perceived injustice, and legislation 
may be introduced in response.1  In a recent article in the University of 
Chicago Law Review, Professors Ian Ayres and Katharine Baker suggest a 
new crime to capture Kobe.  They propose the crime of reckless sexual 
conduct.2 
“Reckless sexual conduct” is, quite simply, unprotected first-encounter 
intercourse.3  As Ayres and Baker summarize: 
The proposal is simple:  a person would be guilty of reckless sexual 
conduct and subject to imprisonment up to three months, if, in a 
first-time sexual encounter with another specific person, he or she 
had sexual intercourse without using a condom.  Consent to 
unprotected intercourse would be an affirmative defense, to be 
established by the defendant by preponderance of the evidence.  
The prosecution would have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that this was the first time that the defendant had sexual intercourse 
with the accuser and that no condom was used.4 
This proposed statute aims to decrease acquaintance rape by creating a 
“default rule” of condom usage that will have “information-forcing 
effects.”5  The authors contend that the time lapse created by a man 
 
 1 For instance, the acquittal of John Hinckley resulted in significant changes to many 
jurisdictions’ definitions of insanity.  See Sanford H. Kadish, Fifty Years of Criminal Law:  An 
Opinionated Review, 87 CAL. L. REV. 943, 959-60 (1999). 
 2 Ian Ayres & Katharine Baker, A Separate Crime of Reckless Sex, 72 U. CHI. L. REV.  599, 
599 (2005).  The article’s introduction features a hypothetical wherein “Star,” “a married 
multimillionaire basketball star” is charged with raping a nineteen-year-old in a Colorado 
resort.  Id. at 599-601. 
 3 “The term ‘first-time sexual encounter’ refers to the first time that two particular 
people have sexual intercourse. . . . The term is not limited to the first time that an 
individual has sex.”  Id. at 601. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Id. at 631. 
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putting on a condom, or getting consent not to do so, presents an 
opportunity for the woman to express whether she actually desires 
intercourse.6  With more deliberation and communication, the likelihood 
of acquaintance rape will be reduced.7  Moreover, in those instances in 
which an acquaintance rape still occurs, the separate crime of reckless 
sex is intended to offer a new tool for prosecutors:  “Reasonable doubts 
can remain whether an alleged acquaintance rapist raped, but there is 
often no question that he engaged in an unprotected first-time sexual 
encounter.”8 
The authors also aim at a second evil:  the spread of sexually 
transmitted diseases (“STDs”).9  STDs can cause significant harm to those 
infected and also present a public health problem.10  Condoms, of course, 
prevent the spread of these diseases.11 
This proposal is intended to encompass the conduct of the authors’ 
caricature of Kobe Bryant, whom they refer to as “Star.”12  Star, a 
married, “multimillionaire basketball star,” is accused of raping a 
nineteen-year-old at a Colorado resort.13  Star claims that the two had 
vaginal intercourse, but he stopped prior to ejaculation at the woman’s 
request.14 
Ayers and Baker contend that, although it will be difficult to prosecute 
Star for rape, he is still guilty of other wrongs:  “Even if factually 
innocent of rape, Star may well be responsible for exacerbating the 
epidemic risks of HIV, pelvic inflammatory disease, various forms of 
genital cancers, nervous system damage, infertility, high blood pressure, 
thromboembolic disease, and something like posttraumatic stress 
disorder.”15  “[T]hese risks are routinely inflicted without any criminal  
 
 
 6 Id. at 636 (“[T]he break in the action caused by the attempt to put on a condom will 
present an opportunity for the parties (primarily women) to better express whether or not 
they truly consent.”). 
 7 Id.; see also id. at 619-20. 
 8 Id. at 603. 
 9 The category of “STDs” encompasses chlamydia, gonorrhea, syphilis, genital herpes, 
genital warts, and HIV.  Id. at 604-05. 
 10 Id. at 604-06. 
 11 Id. at 630-31; see also Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Male Latex 
Condoms and Sexually Transmitted Diseases, http://www.cdc.gov/nchstp/od/latex.htm 
(last visited Sept. 27, 2005) (stating that condoms prevent spread of STDs). 
 12 Ayers & Baker, supra note 2, at 599. 
 13 Id. 
 14 Id. at 599, 600 n.3. 
 15 Id. at 601. 
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sanction.”16  The authors intend the crime of “reckless sexual conduct” to 
fill that gap.17 
The goals of this proposal are admirable.  Given the current risks of 
contracting an STD, it is simply foolish to have a one-night stand without 
a condom.  It is also undoubtedly true that at least some acquaintance 
rapes are the result of miscommunication and that most acquaintance 
rapists currently escape the reach of the law.18 
The proposal, however, is deeply flawed.  As a public health 
regulation, this proposed statute is highly problematic.  It is 
overinclusive, thereby punishing the morally innocent.  Moreover, its 
conception of consent as an affirmative defense fundamentally 
misunderstands criminal responsibility. 
The overinclusiveness of the proposed statute and the inclusion of a 
consent defense are completely intelligible, however, when we focus on 
the true aim of the proposal.  As the introduction focusing on Star 
evinces,19 the authors are actually rape reformers.  Their approach is 
novel — they apply Ayres’s theory of information-forcing default rules 
to the criminal law.  The authors seek to prevent rape by fostering 
communication. 
However, as rape legislation, this proposal is morally objectionable 
and constitutionally impermissible:  it punishes the innocent and 
improperly allocates the burden of proving consent to the defendant.  
This proposed statute also distracts from true rape reform by offering a 
second-best solution.  Finally, the compromise verdict the authors seek is 
too much of a compromise — the authors offer a lesser alternative to 
rape reform, an alternative that may ultimately undermine the 
seriousness of the very rapes they seek to prevent. 
I.   THE PROBLEMS AND THE PROPOSAL 
In their article, Ayres and Baker set forth a formidable argument as to 
the evils of STDs and acquaintance rape.  They begin with the claim that 
sex is dangerous.20  The first danger is STDs, and the statistics they cite 
 
 16 Id. 
 17 Id. 
 18 Ayers and Baker cite a Senate Judiciary Committee finding that 98% of rapists are 
not caught, tried, and imprisoned.  Id. at 637 & n.151. 
 19 Id. at 599-601. 
 20 Id. at 603. 
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are staggering.  The authors tell us, inter alia, that fifteen million new 
cases of STDs are diagnosed each year, that one in six men aged 15 to 49 
has genital herpes, and that 25% of sexually active teenagers have an 
STD.21  Women are more susceptible to these diseases, and, with the 
exception of HIV, the effects on women are more serious than the effects 
on men.22 
We also learn that a small proportion of the population is responsible 
for the spread of STDs.  While the average individual has seven to nine 
partners, a minority of individuals has sex with a significantly greater 
number of people.23  It is this latter group that perpetuates STD 
infections.24  It also stands to reason that it is this group that partakes in 
most one-night stands.25  Hence, Ayres and Baker maintain that 
enforcing condom usage in first (and likely only) encounters should have 
a significant effect on the spread of disease.26 
According to the authors, sex is also dangerous because of its 
emotional content.27  Sex is often emotionally laden, but there is even 
greater emotional destruction associated with rape.28  Ayres and Baker 
claim that the line between rape and sex is all but clear, and they cite one 
researcher who contends that misperception is the likely cause of many 
acquaintance rapes.29  Acquaintance rapes typically occur in first sexual 
encounters, and during acquaintance rapes, condoms are rarely used.30 
The authors conclude that “two attributes of sex — sex that is a first-
time encounter between two particular people, and sex that is 
unprotected — when combined are strongly linked to both STDs and 
acquaintance rape.”31  Ayres and Baker aver that both evils may be 
prevented through the following statute: 
Reckless Sexual Conduct 
(1) A person is guilty of reckless sexual conduct when the person 
 
 21 Id. at 604. 
 22 Id. at 605-06. 
 23 Id. at 607. 
 24 Id. at 611 (“For example, if everyone had exactly eight sexual partners during the 
course of his or her lifetime . . . most STDs would cease to exist.”). 
 25 Id. at 612. 
 26 Id. at 617. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. at 618. 
 29 Id. at 619. 
 30 Id. at 620. 
 31 Id. at 622. 
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intentionally engages in unprotected sexual activity with another 
person who is not his or her spouse and these two people had not 
on an occasion previous to the occasion of the crime engaged in 
sexual activity. 
(2) Affirmative Defense:  Notwithstanding Subsection (1), it shall be 
an affirmative defense to any action brought under this article that 
the person, with whom the defendant had unprotected sex, 
expressly asked to engage in unprotected sexual activity or 
otherwise gave unequivocal indications of affirmatively consenting 
to engage in sexual activity that is specifically unprotected. 
(3) Definitions: 
(a) “Sexual activity” means penile penetration of a vagina or 
anus accomplished by a male or female. 
(b) “Unprotected sexual activity” means sexual activity without 
the use of a condom. 
(c) “Occasion of the crime” includes the twelve-hour period 
after the two people engage in sexual activity for the first time. 
(4) Sanctions: 
(a) Sentence:  The crime of reckless sexual conduct is punishable 
in the state prison for three months, or a fine. 
(b) Sexual Offender Status:  The court shall not register a person 
as a sexual offender because the person was found guilty of 
reckless sexual conduct.32 
The authors explain that this proposal, although innovative, is 
consistent with existing law.  First-encounter sex is currently treated 
with greater suspicion than later encounters, as evidenced by rape 
spousal immunity provisions and by the admission of prior sexual 
behavior between the victim and the accused.33  Additionally, statutes 
and case law already address the relevance of condom use to the 
presence or absence of consent.34 
Ayres and Baker also note that the legal landscape already contains 
 
 32 Id. at 632-34. 
 33 Id. at 622-24. 
 34 Id. at 626-27 (citing cases finding that request to use condom is insufficient to prove 
consent to intercourse, but is sufficient to prove lack of consent to unprotected intercourse). 
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complementary statutes.  The Model Penal Code bars reckless 
endangerment.35  California criminalizes unprotected sexual activity 
where the individual knows he has HIV, fails to disclose it, and acts with 
the specific intent to infect his partner.36  Missouri, on the other hand, 
requires the actor to disclose his HIV status regardless of whether he 
uses a condom.37 
However, the authors contend the legal landscape is incomplete. For 
example, in Missouri, an infected individual is not immunized by using 
a condom, and thus, the state’s statute provides no incentive for condom 
use.38  Moreover, endangerment prosecutions have focused almost 
exclusively on HIV.39  Finally, the authors argue that no statute exists to 
protect victims from the emotional havoc created by nonconsensual sex.40 
In the third part of their paper, Ayres and Baker contend their 
proposed statute would abate these evils.  They employ three different 
frameworks — the rational-actor, behaviorist, and social norms 
approaches — to demonstrate how their proposed statute would work.  
Rational actors would use condoms not only because they fear false 
complaints but also as the result of the communication that a default 
condom rule would engender.41  From a behaviorist perspective, the 
proposed law would fight against availability bias and optimism, both of 
which may cause individuals to underestimate the risks of STDs and 
acquaintance rape.42  Finally, because most people already use condoms 
in first-time encounters,43 the proposed statute would reinforce the 
existing social norm while giving men an independent reason to reach 
for a condom without this action being perceived as an admission of 
infection.44 
Ayres and Baker also claim that justice would be served more often 
under their statute.  Currently, most acquaintance rapists go 
 
 35 Id. at 627-28; see MODEL PENAL CODE § 211 (1962). 
 36 Ayers & Baker, supra note 2, at 628; see CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 120290 (West 
2005). 
 37 Ayers & Baker, supra note 2, at 628; see MO. ANN. STAT. § 191.677 (West 2002). 
 38 Ayers & Baker, supra note 2, at 628-29. 
 39 Id. at 629. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. at 635-37. 
 42 Id. at 647-50.  “Availability bias refers to people’s tendency to appreciate and 
internalize only those risks that are obvious — or readily cognitively available.”  Id. at 648 
n.182. 
 43 Id. at 650-51. 
 44 Id. at 651-52. 
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unpunished.45  Ayres and Baker argue that if their statute were enacted, 
acquaintance rapists might very well be convicted, as it would be easy 
for prosecutors to establish that the act was a first encounter and that it 
was unprotected.46  Moreover, Ayres and Baker believe that jurors would 
be willing to convict those whom they do not believe are “real rapists” 
because the punishment is not severe.47  Shifting the burden of proving 
consent to the defendant would also increase convictions, and although 
it would also increase the risk of punishing the innocent, Ayres and 
Baker dismiss this concern because “[c]urrent research suggests that the 
propensity of women to make false reports of acquaintance rape is 
extremely low.”48  Men, they argue, can escape punishment simply by 
wearing a condom.49 
In the fourth part of their paper, Ayres and Baker address the 
constitutionality of their proposed statute.  First, they argue that public 
policy supports placing the burden of proving consent on the defendant.  
Favorable aspects of their proposal from a public policy perspective 
include increasing the likelihood of crime reporting, offsetting the 
difficulty of proving nonconsent, and coinciding with the common sense 
view that no woman would willingly and recklessly put her health at 
risk.50  Second, the authors contend the allocation passes constitutional 
muster.51  Ayres and Baker argue that their proposed statute addresses a 
crime different from rape because their goal, unlike that of rape statutes, 
is to criminalize unprotected sex.52  Indeed, the authors assert that the 
affirmative defense could be altogether abolished and the proposed 
statute would remain justified “for public health reasons.”53  At one 
point, they go so far as to argue that “nonconsensual sex is not the target 
 
 45 Id. at 637. 
 46 Id. at 638. 
 47 Id. at 656; see also SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 3-4 (1987) (noting often made, but 
inappropriate, distinction between acquaintance rape (“simple rape”) and stranger rape 
(“real rape”)). 
 48 Ayers & Baker, supra note 2, at 639. 
 49 Id. at 640 (“From an ex ante perspective, they hold the keys to their own jail house.”).  
The authors also address the possibility that their proposal immunizes rapists so long as 
they wear a condom.  However, they dismiss this possibility not only because it is unlikely 
in stranger rape cases but also because “it would be hard to imagine a regime with a lower 
probability of punishments” for current acquaintance rapes.  Id. at 640-42. 
 50 Id. at 658-59. 
 51 They also argue that the statute does not unduly burden privacy and freedom of 
association.  Id. at 661-64. 
 52 Id. at 660. 
 53 Id. 
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of our statute.”54  Ultimately, the authors claim that the rationale for the 
affirmative defense is the mitigation of the defendant’s culpability 
because his partner “actively solicited” the unprotected sex, thus  
 
“parallel[ing] the affirmative defenses of entrapment and irresistible 
impulse.”55 
Thus, Ayres and Baker present a seemingly comprehensive argument 
in support of the separate crime of reckless sex.  Requiring men to wear a 
condom (or to get consent not to do so) can reduce the evils of STDS and 
acquaintance rape.56 
II. THE PERILS OF THE PROPOSAL 
Despite the legitimacy of its aims, this proposal should never become 
law.  As STD legislation, it is morally illegitimate and its consent defense 
is conceptually confused.  It is only when we view the proposal through 
the prism of rape reform that we can begin to understand the contours of 
this proposed statute.  Yet, even as rape reform, the proposal threatens to 
punish the innocent and to undermine the seriousness of acquaintance 
rape. 
A.  The STD Rationale 
The first goal of the proposal is to minimize STDs.  I argue in this 
section that, with regard to this rationale, the statute is problematic in 
 
 54 Id. at 661. 
 55 Id. at 660-61. 
 56 The authors’ discussion primarily depicts male defendants and female victims.  I 
follow their usage.  Under the authors’ proposed statute, women will be largely immune 
from prosecution when a man does not use a condom because, as the authors state, the 
“man’s choice to place his unsheathed penis inside the woman in most cases would 
provide an unequivocal indication [of his consent].”  Id. at 642.  The authors claim this de 
facto asymmetry is justified because the vast majority of acquaintance rapists are male, 
women are more likely to be injured by STD transmission, and the authors want to 
encourage rape reporting.  Id. at 644. 
  One analytical gap is worth mentioning here.  The authors’ statistics reveal that 
homosexual men engage in the most one-night stands.  Id. at 614.  Indeed, the authors draw 
the reader’s attention to this fact and then discuss the constitutionality of the 
disproportionate burden their legislation will have on gay men.  Id. at 615, 663.  One thus 
may question whether the proposed statute aims at the same set of relationships — the 
authors believe that gay men will be affected by the STD aspect of the legislation and that 
heterosexual men will be affected by the acquaintance rape aspect of the legislation.  Thus, 
the male perpetrator/female victim dichotomy does not depict the true state of affairs, at 
least with respect to the STD rationale. 
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two respects.  First, it is overinclusive, thereby threatening to punish the 
morally innocent.  Second, the statute is underinclusive in a manner that 
undermines criminal responsibility — it offers a conceptually confused 
theory of excuse. 
1. This Proposal Is Overinclusive and Punishes Morally Innocent 
Conduct 
The proposed statute is overinclusive.  As Ayers and Baker note, 
statutes already exist that criminalize an infected individual’s failure to 
disclose that he has an STD.57  There is, however, a critical distinction 
between statutes such as Missouri’s and California’s and that of the 
authors.  In the former statutes, the defendant (1) actually has the STD 
and (2) culpably risks transmitting the disease.  In contrast, under the 
authors’ proposal, even a defendant who knows that he does not have an 
STD can be guilty of reckless sexual conduct.  This, of course, is a 
significant difference. 
Indeed, it is only in a footnote that the authors address their statute’s 
overinclusive nature: 
To the extent our statute regulates unprotected sex that could not 
pose a public health threat (between two people who knew they 
were not STD carriers), our statute imposes an unnecessary health 
regulation . . . . This class of cases is so minute and the cost of 
compliance is so small (get consent or use a condom) that we think 
it extraordinarily unlikely that it could be seen to violate 
constitutional guarantees of due process.  Overinclusive criminal 
statutes are not forbidden by the Constitution.58 
The authors are correct in their contention that “[o]verinclusive 
criminal statutes are not forbidden by the Constitution.”59  The Supreme 
Court has had little to say about substantive criminal law.60  Criminal 
statutes, unless burdening a fundamental right, are subject only to 
rational basis review.61  Thus, as one commentator has noted, a state 
 
 57 Id. at 627-28. 
 58 Id. at 661 n.235. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Markus Dirk Dubber, Toward a Constitutional Law of Crime and Punishment, 55 
HASTINGS L.J. 509, 509 (2004) (“It has become a commonplace that there are no meaningful 
constitutional constraints on substantive criminal law.”). 
 61 Douglas N. Husak, Guns and Drugs:  Case Studies on the Principled Limits of the 
Criminal Sanction, 23 LAW & PHIL. 437, 465-66 (2004). 
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could constitutionally criminalize eating sausage to prevent obesity.62 
 
Academics have long argued that the Supreme Court’s rational basis 
standard is an inadequate standard of review for criminal statutes.  The 
state should have a good reason to coerce citizens into acting or not 
acting in a specific manner.63  Criminal legislation that is overinclusive is 
morally illegitimate in that it criminalizes conduct that is not wrongful 
and thus is not appropriately the subject of regulation.64  In such cases, 
the state threatens to punish an individual for conduct that she should be 
at liberty to engage in.  When the individual breaks such a law, despite 
engaging in morally innocent behavior, that person is incarcerated — a 
significant deprivation of liberty.65 
As Professor Sherry Colb has argued, “liberty from confinement 
cannot be relegated to the status of unprotected aspects of daily life, 
subject to any regulation that is not utterly irrational.”66  In illustrating 
what would be objectionable overinclusive legislation, Colb imagines “a 
statute that provides for the incarceration of those engaging in 
premarital sex to further the compelling interest in public health by 
shielding citizens from deadly diseases.”67  There is little difference 
between Colb’s hypothetical law and that proposed by Ayres and Baker.  
Colb’s law might punish more innocent people, but it, too, meets rational 
basis review, the only standard that Ayres and Baker believe to be 
relevant. 
Here, Ayres and Baker’s proposal threatens to take away an 
individual’s liberty when he actually presents no risk of the harms the 
proposed statute seeks to prevent.  Their criminal net encompasses 
 
 62 Id. at 467; see also William J. Stunz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. 
L. REV. 505, 507 (2001) (“It has long been a source of academic complaint; indeed, it has 
long been the starting point for virtually all the scholarship in this field, which . . . 
consistently argues that existing criminal liability rules are too broad and ought to be 
narrowed.”). 
 63 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW:  HARM TO OTHERS 9 (1984) 
(“Liberty should be the norm; coercion always needs some special justification.”). 
 64 See also Douglas N. Husak, Reasonable Risk Creation and Overinclusive Legislation, 1 
BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 599, 605 (1998) (“[T]he sentiment that underlies the presumption of 
innocence seems applicable to a defendant whose act-token violates an overinclusive 
statute, even though it is reasonable and thus should not have been criminalized in the first 
place.”). 
 65 See Sherry F. Colb, Freedom from Incarceration:  Why Is This Right Different from All 
Other Rights?, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 781, 821 (1994). 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. at 828. 
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everyone from eighteen-year-old virgins to promiscuous twenty-seven-
year-olds, from those who see doctors to those who do not.  However, if 
neither individual has an STD, they simply present no risk of 
contributing to STD epidemics.  In such cases, the state does not have 
any good reason to restrict their behavior in any manner, no matter how 
slight the coercion is. 
 
In addition, to the extent that the authors might justify punishing this 
morally innocent behavior for deterrence reasons (e.g., to encourage 
condom use by others), this rationale is particularly troublesome.  
Empirical data indicate that changes in criminal law rules have little 
deterrent effect.68  Thus, the innocent are essentially sacrificed for no 
purpose whatsoever.  Moreover, the criminal justice system operates best 
when it reflects the community’s views of desert, and deviations from 
desert — punishing innocent people — can ultimately undermine the 
moral force of the criminal law.69 
The proposed statute should be restructured to eliminate this injustice.  
Three different types of situations may be legitimately criminalized.  
First, if an actor acts purposefully, knowingly, or recklessly as to 
transmitting the disease, is an STD carrier, and actually infects another 
person, his conduct should be criminalized.  Second, if an actor acts 
purposefully, knowingly, or recklessly as to transmitting the disease, is 
an STD carrier, but does not infect his partner, his conduct, too, could be 
covered.  This type of conduct would be analogous to an attempt.  
Finally, the proposed statute could cover the situation wherein the 
defendant does not have the disease but still culpably risks infecting 
others.  To illustrate, an individual who has had fifty unprotected 
encounters may have been fortunate enough to avoid an STD, but he 
may still be quite cognizant of the risk that he is a carrier.  If he fails to 
 
 68 Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Does Criminal Law Deter?  A Behavioural Science 
Investigation, 24 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 173, 204 (2004) (“[T]he standard practice of 
formulating criminal law liability and punishment rules to optimize deterrent effect is 
indefensible given the rarity with which such rule formulation is likely to have the 
intended effect on crime decisions.”).  I thank Doug Husak for this point. 
 69 Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453, 497-
98 (1997) (“Most importantly, it is clear that a utilitarian calculus in determining the rules 
for the distribution of criminal liability and punishment must take account of real-world 
costs that come from deviating from the community’s principles of deserved punishment.  
The costs and benefits of moral credibility may be more difficult to measure than those of 
the factors typically taken into account by utilitarian calculations in the past, but if they are 
more powerful in their effect than the other factors, to ignore them risks rendering the 
calculation meaningless.”). 
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confirm his noninfected status and willingly puts his future partners at 
risk, the proposed statute should cover his conduct.  While punishing 
those who present no real risk of infection might be controversial, this 
approach would still be narrower than the authors’ proposal, as it would 
not encompass morally innocent behavior. 
In each of the situations presented above, there is a reason to 
criminalize the actor’s behavior.  Each individual acts culpably because 
he has expressed his willingness to harm another.  Hence, the state may 
legitimately criminalize such behavior. 
2. Ayres and Baker’s Proposal Inappropriately Contains a Consent 
Defense, Thus Offering a Conceptually Confused Theory of 
Excuse 
The proposed statute thus revised still needs significant work, 
however, because it is also underinclusive, and it is underinclusive in a 
particularly problematic way.  The authors seek to legitimize placing the 
burden of proving consent on the defendant by arguing that the statute 
is a public health regulation.70  According to Ayres and Baker, the 
consent defense is analogous to the defenses of entrapment or irresistible 
impulse.71  They claim that men are less culpable when they are 
encouraged or seduced to “behave recklessly with regard to the spread 
of STDs.”72  This excuse theory of consent offers an inappropriate defense 
to the guilty and presents a conceptually confused view of criminal 
responsibility. 
Consent cannot operate as an excuse.  If this proposed statute aims at 
the public welfare, then the defendant’s culpability is in no way 
mitigated simply because he acts on a desire to have unprotected 
intercourse and his partner is a willing, and perhaps encouraging, 
participant.  Many, many factors influence people to commit crimes.  
They are often seduced or enticed.  This does not excuse the actors, 
 
 70 Ayers & Baker, supra note 2, at 643 n.166 (“From the perspective of acquaintance 
rape, it is obviously relevant to a defendant’s culpability whether or not the woman 
consented.  But, . . . the affirmative defense is constitutional only if it does not represent an 
essential element of the crime.  Accordingly, we explicitly want to ground the defense as a 
way of mitigating the culpability of acting recklessly with regard to the social risk of 
STDs.”). 
 71 Id. at 643-44; id. at 661 (“[O]ur affirmative defense parallels the affirmative defenses 
of entrapment and irresistible impulse — defenses that qualify society’s condemnation of 
the defendant’s state of mind.”). 
 72 Id. at 643-44. 
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however.  “Causation is not compulsion”;73 otherwise, responsibility 
would vanish.74  It is only when the defendant lacks the capacity or the 
fair opportunity to refrain from criminal conduct that we are willing to 
excuse him from criminal responsibility.75 
Accordingly, the two defenses to which the authors seek to analogize 
their consent defense, irresistible impulse and entrapment, are simply 
inapposite.  Irresistible impulse is an insanity test, wherein the defendant 
lacks volitional control.76  That is not the case here.  No matter how 
desirable his partner is, the man retains control over his participation in 
intercourse and the use of a condom.  Encouragement and enticement do 
not compel him to commit the criminal act. 
Entrapment, in turn, is best viewed as a nonexculpatory defense,77 
resting on the public policy rationale that “the judicial process ought not 
to be sullied by the use of improper police misconduct to procure 
convictions.”78  Entrapment cannot be understood to reflect the view that 
encouragement itself excuses, because the defense does not apply 
generally, but only to conduct by police officers.79  Thus, neither of these 
defenses provides any support for the claim that encouragement excuses.  
Indeed, criminal law tells us just the opposite:  the woman’s 
encouragement establishes her complicity — it does not excuse the 
man.80 
 
 73 MICHAEL S. MOORE, PLACING BLAME:  A THEORY OF CRIMINAL LAW 526 (1997). 
 74 Id. at 522-47 (arguing that causation does not excuse); Stephen J. Morse, Excusing and 
the New Excuse Defenses:  A Legal and Conceptual Review, 23 CRIME & JUST. 329, 350 (1998) 
(defining “the ‘fundamental psycholegal error’:  Causation is neither an excuse per se nor 
the equivalent of compulsion, which is an excusing condition.”). 
 75 JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 17.03[E] (3d ed. 2001) 
(discussing personhood theory, which requires that we “excuse people whose ability to 
reason practically is grossly disturbed or underdeveloped (e.g., insane people and infants) . 
. . [and] those whose opportunity to reason practically is seriously undermined on an 
individual occasion (e.g., due to passion or coercion)”); PAUL H. ROBINSON, STRUCTURE AND 
FUNCTION IN CRIMINAL LAW 83 (1997) (“[T]he actor can point to abnormal circumstances or 
abnormal characteristics that make it too difficult for the actor to appreciate the criminality 
or wrongfulness of his or her conduct or too difficult to conform his or her conduct to the 
requirements of law.”). 
 76 DRESSLER, supra note 75, § 25.04[C][2]. 
 77 2 PAUL ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES § 209(b), at 513-16 (1984). 
 78 Id. § 209(b), at 513; see also Anthony M. Dillof, Unraveling Unlawful Entrapment, 94 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 827, 845-57 (2004) (explaining why individual’s culpability is not 
diminished when he is entrapped). 
 79 ROBINSON, supra note 77, at 515. 
 80 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(3)(a)(i) (1962) (solicitation establishes accomplice 
liability); id. § 5.02(1) (defining solicitation as, among other things, “encouragement”).  See 
generally Sanford H. Kadish, Complicity, Cause and Blame:  A Study in the Interpretation of 
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Moreover, from the standpoint of the public health rationale, there is 
simply no reason to excuse the defendant simply because the victim 
consented to the unprotected intercourse.81  If this statute were designed 
to protect the woman, consent would be relevant because it would 
negate the wrongfulness of the action.82  However, as a public health 
regulation, the harm extends beyond the two participants.  In such cases, 
the consent of the woman is insufficient to address the evil sought to be 
prevented.83 
Indeed, consider the authors’ claim that Star’s conduct increased the 
risk of harms to multiple persons because he “did not know whether the 
nineteen-year-old was infected with a sexually transmitted disease,” thus 
increasing “the chance that both he and any other individuals with 
whom he would subsequently engage sexually (including his wife) 
 
Doctrine, 73 CAL. L. REV. 323, 333 (1985) (explaining that rationale behind complicity 
doctrine is that accomplice cannot be said to “cause” principal’s actions).  Kadish states:   
That same view of human action that entails freedom to choose obviously 
applies to the actions of one who is responding to the actions of another.  In the 
same sense and for the same reasons that a person’s genes, upbringing, and 
social surroundings are not seen as the cause of his actions, neither are the 
actions of another seen as the cause of his actions.  We regard a person’s acts as 
the products of his choice, not as an inevitable, natural result of a chain of events.  
Therefore, antecedent events do not cause a person to act in the same way that 
they cause things to happen, and neither do the antecedent acts of others.  To 
treat the acts of others as causing a person’s actions (in the physical sense of 
cause) would be inconsistent with the premise on which we hold a person 
responsible. 
Id.  
 81 Eliminating the affirmative defense of consent would not “thereby transform[] the 
crime into a strict liability offense,” as the authors claim it would.  Ayers & Baker, supra 
note 2, at 643; see also id. at 660 (“[A] strict liability offense, which would remove consent 
from the analysis completely, could readily be justified as necessary for public health 
reasons.”). 
  Ayers and Baker’s proposed statute might itself be viewed as imposing some type of 
formal or substantive strict liability:  the defendant must intend intercourse, but no mens 
rea is required as to whether the defendant is infected, and the defendant need not even be 
infected.  This has nothing to do with consent.  Consent is not relevant to (1) the defendant’s 
mental state regarding whether he is infected or (2) whether the defendant actually is 
infected.  Thus, while allowing consent as a defense will undoubtedly reduce the number 
of people who fall within the proposed statute’s proscriptions, the defense achieves this 
goal by relying on an arbitrary and irrelevant fact.  The authors might as well allow “being 
a brunette” to be an affirmative defense — such a defense would be equally (un)intelligible. 
 82 In such a case, however, it would be unconstitutional to allocate the burden of 
proving consent to the defendant.  See infra text accompanying notes 107-15. 
 83 PETER WESTEN, THE LOGIC OF CONSENT:  THE DIVERSITY AND DECEPTIVENESS OF 
CONSENT AS A DEFENSE TO CRIMINAL CONDUCT 114-19 (2004) (explaining why consent does 
not apply to offenses that cause harm to people beyond participants). 
 
2006] A Reckless Response to Rape 653 
 
would become infected.”84  Nothing in the authors’ proposed statute 
would solve this problem.  Infected risk-takers who choose to engage in 
reckless sex with consenting partners are immune from prosecution for 
the reckless act, despite the fact that they increase the risk to third parties 
(including their wives).  And these actors are immune from liability in 
subsequent encounters with their wives because those acts would not be 
first encounters.  Thus, consent as an affirmative defense undermines the 
proposed statute’s effectiveness. 
To the extent that the proposal aims at reducing the spread of STDs, it 
misses the mark.  While the goal is admirable, Ayers and Baker risk 
punishing the innocent.  The authors also disregard the effect that their 
affirmative defense of consent would have — it would free the guilty.  
The proposed statute must be restructured so as to eliminate these 
effects. 
B. As Rape Reform 
The problems with Ayers and Baker’s proposed statute as STD 
legislation may ultimately be beside the point.  The true target of this 
proposal is acquaintance rape.  Understood from this perspective, the 
proposed statute need not be limited to infected individuals and the 
defense of consent is relevant.85  Through the prism of rape reform, the 
pieces of this proposal come together. 
Unfortunately, even as rape legislation, the proposal is unsound.  In 
this section, I explain how the proposal seeks to establish penalty 
defaults so as to “force” individuals to communicate about consent.86  
Next, I claim that the authors’ default rule punishes the innocent.  I 
further argue that this statute is unconstitutional and morally 
objectionable because it places the burden of proving consent on the 
defendant.  Finally, I turn to the practical problems with this proposal.  
First, I argue that it amounts to a second-best proxy for consent that 
avoids the true debates we must have about rape law.  Second, I argue 
that the compromise verdicts sought by the authors could reinforce 
existing views that acquaintance rape is not “real rape.” 
 
 84 Ayers & Baker, supra note 2, at 601 n.8. 
 85 See Id. at 661 n.235 (noting that when two individuals are not STD carriers in “this 
small group of people . . . the statute might be seen as regulating the same thing as rape 
statutes because the only reason to require such couples to use protection is to protect 
against nonconsensual sex”). 
 86 Id. at 631. 
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1. The Authors Apply Information-Forcing Default Rules to the 
Criminal Law 
In a 1989 article, Professor Ayres and his co-author Professor Robert 
Gertner famously introduced the concept of “penalty defaults” to 
contract law.87  At that time, when faced with an incomplete contract, 
commentators urged courts to set default rules according to what the 
parties would have wanted.88  Ayres and Gertner, however, argued for 
penalty defaults that are set “at what the parties would not want — in 
order to encourage the parties to reveal information to each other or to 
third parties.”89  “Penalty defaults are designed to give at least one party 
to the contract an incentive to contract around the default rule and 
therefore to choose affirmatively the contract provision they prefer.”90 
Ayres and Baker expand the usage of these default rules to the law of 
rape.91  The authors create an incentive for the man to ask the right 
questions.  If a man needs to reach for a condom, there will be a pause in 
the sexual activity that will give both parties an opportunity to 
communicate about consent.  If the man asks the woman for permission 
to forego using a condom, there will likewise be an opportunity for 
communication.  But if the man simply proceeds with intercourse 
without stopping for a condom or obtaining articulated consent, the 
penalty default kicks in.  He has forgone the opportunity for 
communication and is guilty of reckless sexual conduct.  Thus, the 
proposed statute, “though not as explicit in its communication forcing as 
those rules that require verbal consent before initiating a move to a 
higher level of sexual intimacy, would likely have comparable 
information-forcing effects.”92 
 
 87 Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts:  An Economic Theory 
of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91 (1989). 
 88 Id. at 89. 
 89 Id. at 91. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Ayers & Baker, supra note 2, at 631; cf. Elizabeth F. Emens, Monogamy’s Law:  
Compulsory Monogamy and Polyamorous Existence, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 277, 374-
75 (2004) (offering thought experiment of information-forcing adultery statute, but 
ultimately concluding it was inappropriate to employ such default rules in criminal law 
context). 
 92 Ayers & Baker, supra note 2, at 631. 
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2. These Information-Forcing Default Rules Are Overinclusive and 
Punish Morally Innocent Behavior 
With the structure of this legal rule articulated, the inquiry turns to 
whether the proposed penalty default can be justified.  In order to make 
this evaluation, it is important to clearly articulate the harm or evil that 
the proposed statute seeks to prevent.  The authors claim that Star and 
other actors have engaged in behavior that falls within “the moral 
category of reckless sexual conduct.”93  However, once we unpack this 
category, it is evident that the proposed statute does not punish a 
different harm, a different culpability level, or a different moral category 
than do those statutes that punish acquaintance rape.94 
First, there is no additional harm at issue besides the harm presented 
by rape.  The authors seem to believe that rape laws fail to criminalize 
the emotional impact of rape: 
The failure of the law to address emotional injuries associated with 
nonconsensual sex is a serious problem because, as mentioned, 
physical injury is often not the gravamen of the harm in rape.  If the 
essential harm of rape can be an emotional harm, it would make 
sense to penalize its reckless infliction.  Our proposed 
criminalization of reckless sexual conduct is tailored to do just that.95 
At another point they argue that, “save rape, there is no regulation of the 
reckless infliction of the emotional harm that can flow from careless 
sexual behavior.”96 
While it may be difficult to articulate the exact harm of rape,97 there is 
no doubt that the current rape laws address the harms listed above.  
Rape is both a physical and emotional injury,98 and it is exactly these 
 
 93 Id. at 656. 
 94 Despite forsaking the rape rationale at one point, the authors clearly target 
acquaintance rape.  E.g., id. at 636 (predicting that their statute would make “clear progress 
in the fight against acquaintance rape”); id. at 638 (“[T]he criminalization of reckless sexual 
conduct is likely to reduce the problem of acquaintance rapists going completely 
unpunished.”); id. at 665 (“Because so many acquaintance rapes are first-time sexual 
encounters, and because so many of those rapes are primarily caused by a lack of 
communication, a law that fosters communication in first time sexual encounters will likely 
be very effective at reducing the incidence of acquaintance rape.  Our proposal is such a 
law.”). 
 95 Id. at 629. 
 96 Id. at 664. 
 97 For an excellent discussion, see ALAN WERTHEIMER, CONSENT TO SEXUAL RELATIONS 
89-118 (2003). 
 98 See ESTRICH, supra note 47, at 103-04 (“Whether one adheres to the ‘rape as sex’ 
 
656 University of California, Davis [Vol. 39:637 
 
harms that rape laws deter and punish.99 
Second, the authors are not getting at a different type of culpability.  
They aim at recklessness: 
In emphasizing that acquaintance rapists are “real rapists,” the [rape 
reform] movement has had the effect of erasing the moral category 
of reckless sexual conduct.  Under their approach, a man is either a 
“rapist” or legally not culpable.  Our statute imposes a less severe 
punishment precisely because what we are attacking directly is 
recklessness, not the result of recklessness.100 
According to Ayres and Baker, an actor is reckless when he does not 
take the time to inquire as to whether the woman is actually 
consenting.101  That is, Ayres and Baker’s complaint is that a man either 
consciously disregards the substantial and unjustifiable risk that the 
woman may not be consenting or he is unreasonably unaware of that 
risk.  These formulations, of course, are the very definitions of 
recklessness and negligence,102 and these culpability levels already exist 
in rape statutes.  Many states convict the man when he is simply 
negligent as to the victim’s lack of consent, and some states arguably 
have strict liability as to this provision.103  Thus, there is no doubt that the 
law currently punishes the reckless actor.  Indeed, in instances in which 
the woman consents but the man believes he is raping her, the man is 
still within the reach of the criminal law through attempt provisions.104 
Admittedly, recklessness as to consent is not always sufficient for 
 
school or the ‘rape as violence’ school, the fact remains that what makes rape, whether 
‘simple’ or ‘aggravated,’ different from other crimes is that rape is a sexual violation — a 
violation of the most personal, most intimate, and most offensive kind.”). 
 99 To the extent that the authors might reply that acquaintance rape without a condom 
is a greater harm, minor reforms of rape laws would address this problem.  The situation is 
analogous to killing someone with one shot versus a machete.  The use of a machete is not 
its own crime, but aggravates the murder.  Once again, the authors are not truly addressing 
a new harm. 
 100 Ayers & Baker, supra note 2, at 656. 
 101 Id. at 602 (“Men who rape recklessly, by not finding the time or compassion to 
discern a partner’s consent, rarely find time to use a condom.”); id. at 620 (“The 
miscommunication, or lack of communication, that characterizes many acquaintance rapes 
can often be traced to recklessness.  Recklessness can lead a man to complete the sexual act 
heedless of the consequences.”). 
 102 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (1962). 
 103 DRESSLER, supra note 75, § 33.05 (noting that in several jurisdictions, honest and 
reasonable mistake as to consent is not defense).  But cf. WESTEN, supra note 83, at 143-44 
(arguing commentators rely on dicta when claiming strict liability is imposed). 
 104 WESTEN, supra note 83, at 148-52 (when victim consents but defendant believes she 
does not, defendant has attempted rape). 
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liability because many rape laws require the element of force.105  My 
argument is not that recklessness is sufficient to convict under current 
law, but that the authors’ target is the wrong of rape and the culpability 
of acquaintance rapists.  Thus, this proposed statute stands or falls on an 
acquaintance rape rationale — there is no separate moral category here 
and no separate wrong or culpability level at issue. 
In other words, the separate crime of reckless sexual conduct is 
justified only to the extent that it covers the recklessness of acquaintance 
rapists or targets the harm inherent in rape.  There is no other 
justification.  Unfortunately, the statute fails to meet this burden because 
the failure to wear a condom is not coextensive with the crime of 
acquaintance rape.  A man can act recklessly as to the woman’s consent 
but still wear a condom, and a man may not be reckless as to consent, 
even if he does not wear a condom.  In the latter instance, this proposed 
statute would punish morally innocent behavior. 
Once again, the purpose of this proposed statute is to prevent the 
harm of rape.  The culpability at issue is the recklessness of a man in 
failing to ascertain whether the woman is consenting.  Thus, there is 
simply no justification for subjecting a man to even one day in jail simply 
because he did not wear a condom while having consensual sexual 
intercourse.  Certainly, the man may be profoundly foolish for not 
wearing a condom, but this law is not designed to protect the man from 
himself — it is designed to protect the woman from rape. 
While this statute will create an incentive to communicate, creating 
incentives is not the purpose of the criminal law.  In the criminal law, a 
“penalty” default requires a justification for that “penalty.”  Failing to 
communicate about the use of a condom is not coextensive with being an 
acquaintance rapist, and Ayers and Baker offer no other justification for 
punishing the failure to communicate.  Retributivists will find punishing 
the innocent to be wholly unjustified, and even utilitarians should fear 
that deviations from desert undermine the moral force of the criminal 
 
 105 E.g., People v. Warren, 446 N.E.2d 591, 593 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (holding that because 
defendant did not use weapon or otherwise directly threaten to harm victim, there was no 
rape); Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, 641 A.2d 1161, 1164-65 (Pa. 1994) (reading 
Pennsylvania rape statute as requiring force, not just nonconsensual sex).  See generally 
ESTRICH, supra note 47, at 58-71 (describing how rape reform legislation shifted focus from 
nonconsent to force in effort to draw focus toward man’s behavior and away from 
woman’s lack of resistance and how this reform has ultimately failed); WESTEN, supra note 
83, at 208 (describing how “force”/“consent” formulation debate rests on false conceptual 
premises because both concepts are capable of incorporating same type of wrongful 
pressures).  I thank Professors Ayres and Baker for prompting me to clarify this point. 
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law.106 
3. The Authors’ Allocation of the Burden of Proving Consent to the 
Defendant Is Morally and Constitutionally Objectionable 
This proposed statute suffers from a second fatal flaw:  the allocation 
of the burden of proving consent to the defendant is morally and 
constitutionally objectionable.107  The authors concede that allocating the 
burden of proving consent to the defendant would be unconstitutional if 
the aim of their statute was to decrease acquaintance rapes.108  Indeed, 
the constitutional impediment is the reason why the authors seek to 
legitimize the allocation under the public health rationale: 
From the perspective of acquaintance rape, it is obviously relevant 
to a defendant’s culpability whether or not the woman consented.  
But, as argued in Part IV.A, the affirmative defense is constitutional 
only if it does not represent an essential element of the crime.  
Accordingly, we explicitly want to ground the defense as a way of 
mitigating the culpability of acting recklessly with regard to the 
social risk of STDs.109 
As discussed previously in Part II.A.2, the attempt to tie the consent 
defense to STDs fails because there is no reason to provide a consent 
defense for a public health regulation.  Indeed, the theory behind a 
“consent as excuse” defense is so conceptually confused that the only 
legitimate explanation for the consent defense is that it applies to the 
rape rationale. 
Once consent is properly understood as applying to the rape rationale, 
it is constitutionally and morally impermissible to allocate the burden to 
the defendant.  Consent possesses “moral magic”:110  it “turns a trespass 
into a dinner party; a battery into a handshake; a theft into a gift; an 
invasion of privacy into an intimate moment; a commercial 
 
 106 See supra text accompanying notes 68-69. 
 107 Ayres and Baker claim that the state of Washington allocates the burden of proving 
“forcible compulsion” to the prosecution, but allocates the burden of proving consent to the 
defendant.  Ayers & Baker, supra note 2, at 659 n.226.  This is also true of the District of 
Columbia.  See Russell v. United States, 698 A.2d 1007, 1116 n.12 (D.C. 1997).  However, 
because “force” negates legal consent, the result is that juries are given contradictory 
instructions.  WESTEN, supra note 83, at 129 n.1. 
 108 Ayers & Baker, supra note 2, at 643 n.166. 
 109 Id. 
 110 Heidi M. Hurd, The Moral Magic of Consent, 2 LEGAL THEORY 121, 121 (1996). 
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appropriation of name and likeness into a biography.”111  Consent can 
thus “make an action right when it would otherwise be wrong.”112  When 
a “victim” consents, there is no wrong and, thus, it is morally illegitimate 
to place the burden of proving consent on the defendant.  The 
prosecution must prove there was a rape, or an act of reckless sex, and if 
the victim consented, there simply was no such act. 
Ayers and Baker’s proposal also violates the Due Process Clause.  
Dating back to In re Winship,113 it has been clear that the prosecution 
bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt “every fact 
necessary to constitute the crime with which [the defendant] is 
charged.”114  When there is sex with consent, there is no rape and, thus, 
no crime.  Consent renders the conduct completely permissible.  Because 
lack of consent is the very circumstance that renders the conduct  
 
criminal, the burden of proving this element must lie with the 
prosecution.115 
While the authors concede that under the rape rationale, placing the 
burden of proving consent on the defendant would run afoul of the 
Constitution, it is worth exploring the implications of their inappropriate 
allocation.116  Consider two claims Ayers and Baker make.  First, they 
state that their proposed statute will reduce acquaintance rapes because 
“it will be fairly easy to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the sex 
was unprotected and that it was a first-time sexual encounter. . . . 
Therefore the criminalization of reckless sexual conduct is likely to 
 
 111 Id. at 123. 
 112 Id. 
 113 397 U.S. 358 (1970). 
 114 Id. at 364. 
 115 It is true that the Supreme Court’s formalism in this area is problematic, as the 
question of what constitutes an essential element depends upon the legislature’s 
formulation of the crime.  See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 223 (1977) (Powell, J., 
dissenting) (“The test the Court today establishes allows a legislature to shift, virtually at 
will, the burden of persuasion with respect to any factor in a criminal case, so long as it is 
careful not to mention the nonexistence of that factor in the statutory language that defines 
the crime.”); Claire Finkelstein, Positivism and the Notion of an Offense, 88 CAL. L. REV. 335, 
341 (2000) (“Something peculiar is at work, however, when the extent of a constitutional 
guarantee that ought to limit the reach of the criminal sanction is determined by the 
legislation establishing the sanction itself.”).  Still, academics have a luxury that legislators 
do not have.  Legislators must respond to political pressures, pressures that may 
sometimes yield less than optimal criminal statutes.  There is simply no reason, however, 
why thoughtful academics cannot draft proposed statutes that present a coherent view of 
the harm sought to be prevented and properly allocate the burden of proof on those issues. 
 116 Ayers & Baker, supra note 2, at 643 n.166. 
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reduce the problem of acquaintance rapists going completely 
unpunished.”117  Of course it will.  The primary problem with 
acquaintance rape prosecutions, as evidenced by the Star hypothetical 
with which the authors begin, is the question of consent.  Consent is 
crucial because it tells us whether the act is rape or sex.  Certainly, if we 
eliminate the pivotal element of rape from the prosecutor’s burden of 
proof, we will get more rape convictions.  The problem is that some of 
those convicted might be factually innocent of the crime. 
The authors are not all that concerned with punishing the innocent.  
Their second claim is that the conventional wisdom reveals that in only 
2% of cases do women falsely accuse men.118  This proportion is 
comparable to that of other major crimes.119  Thus, the authors tell us 
false convictions will not be likely even when the burden of proving 
consent is allocated to the defendant — the risk of error is the same as 
with any other crime.  There is a critical distinction, however.  With other 
major crimes, the prosecution bears the burden of proving every 
essential element.  Hence, even if a defendant is falsely accused, Winship 
protects him from being falsely convicted.  Here, if the proposal allows 
the prosecution to avoid proving the key element of acquaintance rape, 
there will certainly be significant instances of punishing the innocent.  
Winship provides a key protection against the punishment of the 
innocent, and it is that protection the authors seek to circumvent. 
Additionally, the authors cannot defend their allocation of the burden 
of proving consent by reconceptualizing the problem and claiming that 
their proposal punishes recklessness, not the result of recklessness.120  
Admittedly, the defendant may still be culpable in those instances in 
which the victim consents but the defendant is unaware of this fact.  In 
such cases, although the wrong of rape has not occurred, the defendant 
has consciously disregarded the risk that the victim is not consenting.  
He is still culpable.  In such cases, the defendant has attempted rape.121 
Importantly, in such instances, where the defendant proceeds in 
conscious disregard of the possibility that the victim does not consent, 
 
 117 Id. at 638. 
 118 Id. at 639. 
 119 Id. 
 120 See id. at 656; E-mail from Katharine Baker, Professor of Law and Associate Dean, 
Chicago-Kent College of Law, to author (Feb. 1, 2005, 16:49:26 CST) (on file with author). 
 121 See generally MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(1)(a) (1962) (stating that person is guilty of 
attempt when he “purposefully engages in conduct that would constitute the crime if the 
attendant circumstances were as he believes them to be”). 
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consent is necessarily unavailable as a defense.  Indeed, it is the very 
presence of consent that prevents the behavior from constituting rape 
itself (as opposed to attempted rape).  Thus, no consent defense should 
be available at all, and to offer a defense in such a case would 
fundamentally misunderstand the workings of the offense.122 
Ultimately, the relevance of the consent defense turns on the rationale 
for the proposed statute.  If the proposed statute is a public health 
regulation, then, as mentioned previously, a consent defense is 
inappropriate.  If the proposed statute seeks to punish the actor’s 
recklessness, irrespective of the victim’s consent, then the consent 
defense is likewise inappropriate.  Only if the proposed statute aims at 
the wrong of rape is consent relevant, and in that instance, because 
consent negates the wrongfulness of the action, the burden of proof 
properly rests on the prosecution. 
4. This Proposal May Not Advance, and May Ultimately Hinder, 
Rape Reform Efforts 
Finally, even if the authors could restructure their proposed statute to 
avoid these constitutional and moral impediments, we must consider 
whether any separate crime of “reckless sexual conduct” will actually 
advance rape reform.  There are reasons to doubt whether this law 
would be efficacious, and more troubling yet, there is reason to believe 
that this statute might undermine rape laws. 
First, Ayres and Baker obscure the real questions in rape law.  They 
seek to offer a proxy for consent.  Under their proposal, we need not 
inquire into consent for acquaintance rape — we force the information 
by requiring the use of a condom.  But this evades the critical question:  
when may a man permissibly have intercourse with a woman?  Does 
“no” mean no?  Or does only “yes” mean yes?  These are the debates that 
we need to have.  “Do I need a condom?” is not the question.  Nor will it 
give us the right answers.  In 1991, a Ponoma College male sophomore 
asked a female freshman:  “Should I get a condom?”123  She said:  “no.”  
The man understood her to be saying “no” to the condom, and the 
 
 122 An instance of nonconsent by the victim and recklessness on the part of the 
defendant would obtain if the man attempted to rape the woman.  Reckless sexual conduct 
cannot be understood as this type of attempt.  By definition, reckless sexual conduct 
requires the sexual act and an unprotected one at that. 
 123 WESTEN, supra note 83, at 81; see Susan Estrich, This Case Demeans Real Date Rape 
Victims, USA TODAY, May 26, 1994, at A15 (stating that man said “I should get a condom” 
and that woman “‘motioned’ no, by saying uh-uh and shaking her head”). 
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woman meant “no” to the sex.  “Should I get a condom?” does not solve 
the consent problem; it simply creates another layer of confusion. 
The crime of reckless sexual conduct does not even offer a full proxy 
for consent because the statute likewise allows a consent defense.  The 
authors define consent as “expressly ask[ing] to engage in unprotected 
sexual activity or otherwise [giving] unequivocal indications of 
affirmatively consenting to engage in sexual activity that is specifically 
unprotected.”124  If the defendant has an STD and does not reveal this 
when he solicits his partner’s consent to unprotected intercourse, is her 
consent valid?  The same questions regarding the knowledge 
requirements for valid consent reappear.125 
In other respects, however, this proposed statute does what rape laws 
do not always do:  it defines what actions are necessary for consent.  
While many jurisdictions define consent with reference to the victim’s 
state of mind, this proposal’s requirement of an affirmative act may 
minimize mistakes.126  The irony here is two-fold.  First, if states were to 
adopt this definition of consent for their rape statutes, then the separate 
crime of reckless sex would be unnecessary.  Second, to the extent that 
states do not define consent in this manner for rape laws, there is no 
reason for them to adopt a different definition of consent for this crime.  
Thus, this proposed statute only works if states employ two conflicting 
conceptions of consent while seeking to prevent the very same harm. 
The final efficacy problem is, simply put, alcohol.  Drunk people are 
not rational actors, they have a very specific cognitive impairment, and 
they often flout social norms.  One of the most difficult practical 
problems with acquaintance rape is the presence of alcohol and its effects 
on communication and perception.  Nowhere in the authors’ proposal do 
they come to terms with the diminished effect that their proposal will 
have on the behavior of those under the influence.127 
 
 124 Ayers & Baker, supra note 2, at 632. 
 125 Cf. Regina v. Cuerrier, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 371 (“Without disclosure of HIV status there 
can be no true consent.  The consent cannot be simply to have sexual intercourse.  Rather, it 
must be to have intercourse with a partner who is HIV-positive.”). 
 126 Defining consent as an expressive act is not without its problems, however.  
“Indeed, th[e] practice of defining consent in rape cases as a mental state on a subject’s part 
while requiring mens rea on the actor’s part is, if anything, a more precise measure of an 
actor’s guilty mind . . . .”  WESTEN, supra note 83, at 145.  Notably, the authors’ proposal 
does not have a mens rea requirement.  While the Model Penal Code’s default mens rea 
would be recklessness, one suspects that the authors would rather impose negligence or 
even strict liability.  See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(3) (1962) (setting forth default mens rea 
of recklessness). 
 127 Of course, one can make a broader attack on the rational-actor model.  Unprotected 
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Thus, this legislation distracts from rape reform.  It avoids the 
questions we should be asking and instead settles for a second-best 
solution.  The authors offer us another layer of complexity — another 
layer of consent — without resolving the current problems.  We still do 
not know what the victim must know or what she must say or what in 
the world we are to do about intoxicated consent.  The authors’ second-
best solution thus distracts from rape reform while presenting us with 
the very same unanswered questions. 
The efficacy problem does not end here, however.  This proposed 
statute may not just distract from rape reform.  It may undermine it. 
The authors claim that juries will convict actors such as Star, because 
even if the jurors do not perceive Star to be a “real rapist,” they will be 
willing to find him guilty of reckless sex.128  “Reasonable doubts can 
remain whether an alleged acquaintance rapist raped, but there is often 
no question that he engaged in unprotected, first-encounter sex.”129  They 
believe that “the criminalization of reckless sexual conduct is likely to 
decrease the overall ‘errors’ in the criminal justice system.”130  This crime 
“creates the first practicable means of obtaining a conviction — albeit for 
a crime with a modest sanction.”131 
Introducing this “crime with a modest sanction” is offered as a 
solution to the “sticky norms” problem.132  Professor Dan Kahan argues 
that the sticky norms problem “occurs when the prevalence of a social 
norm makes decisionmakers reluctant to carry out a law intended to 
 
sex currently carries the risk of HIV, genital warts, genital herpes, gonorrhea, chlamydia, 
and syphilis, not to mention the risk of creating another human life.  Yet people still have 
unprotected sex.  If, in the movie Alfie, the title character — a paradigmatic disease “node” 
— does not care that having sex with his best friend’s girlfriend/fiancée can give him a 
disease, impregnate her, and ruin his friendship, why would Alfie fear a three-month jail 
term?  ALFIE (Paramount Pictures 2004). 
 128 Ayers & Baker, supra note 2, at 603 (“The crime of reckless sexual conduct will also 
be a powerful prosecutorial tool for the thousands of acquaintance rape cases that are 
simply not winnable under current law.  It represents a way to partially overcome the ‘he 
said/she said’ dilemma.  A prosecutor who does not have enough objective evidence to go 
forward with a rape case could easily have enough objective evidence to prove reckless 
sexual conduct.”); id. at 656 (“Decisionmakers may be willing to ruin the life of a ‘real 
rapist,’ but they will not impose comparable punishment for what they see as a less severe 
crime.  The crime of reckless sexual conduct will make it easier to punish callous sexual 
behavior precisely because the punishment will not ruin the defendants’ lives.”). 
 129 Id. at 603. 
 130 Id. at 637. 
 131 Id. at 638. 
 132 See id. at 654-58. 
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change that norm.”133  When legislation overreaches by punishing 
severely (“hard shoves”), prosecutors are less likely to prosecute and 
juries are less likely to convict, thus potentially causing the contested 
norm to grow in strength.134  Kahan argues that “gentle nudges,” crimes 
with modest sanctions, may be more effective at changing the contested 
norm.135  Ayres and Baker intend their proposed statute to be just such a 
gentle nudge.136 
When defendants are charged with both acquaintance rape and 
reckless sexual conduct, the authors may very well get the compromise 
verdicts they seek.  Behavioral psychology reveals that jurors may seek 
this third alternative.  The “compromise effect” predicts that when jurors 
are offered a middle alternative, they will choose it. 137  Ayres and Baker 
would call this result a success because more rapists will be convicted of 
something, and any innocents caught in the web will only go to jail for a 
short period of time and only because they foolishly failed to wear a 
condom.138 
The obvious problem with the proposed statute is its potential to 
punish the innocent.  This concern warrants repeating.  Ayres and Baker 
brush this fear aside by claiming that the defendant “hold[s] the keys to 
[his] own jailhouse” by determining whether to wear a condom.139  Yet, 
what the statute effectively does is to restrict the liberty of an individual 
despite the fact that he presents no risk of harm.  We all hold the key to 
our own jail cells.  We can prevent false accusations against ourselves by 
staying home, never driving a car, and never speaking to other human 
beings.  But our liberty interests consist not only in liberties from but also 
 
 133 Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves:  Solving the Sticky Norms Problem, 67 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 607, 607 (2000). 
 134 Id. at 609 (“If the law condemns too severely — if it tries to break the grip of the 
contested norm (and the will of its supporters) with a ‘hard shove’ — it will likely prove a 
dead letter and could even backfire.”). 
 135 Id. at 610-11 (“If the lawmaker selects a sufficiently mild degree of severity . . . then a 
majority of decisionmakers will enforce the law at the outset.  This condition, too, will 
reinforce itself.  As members of society are exposed to consistent and conspicuous instances 
of enforcement, they will revise upward their judgment of the degree of condemnation 
warranted by the conduct in question.  Accordingly, over time, the percentage of 
decisionmakers willing to enforce the existing law will grow . . . .”). 
 136 Id. at 654-58. 
 137 See generally Neil Vidmar, Effects of Decision Alternatives on the Verdicts and Social 
Perceptions of Simulated Jurors, 22 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 211 (1972). 
 138 Ayers & Baker, supra note 2, at 640 (“Switching from a regime with very large and 
unavoidable Type I errors [failing to punish the guilty] to one with small but avoidable 
Type II errors [punishing the innocent] is a tradeoff that society should embrace.”). 
 139 Id. 
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in liberties to, and it is this latter liberty that the state must have a good 
reason to restrict.140  A man who has consensual sex and does not have an 
STD should not have his liberty restricted under this proposed statute.  
Moreover, if falsely accused, he certainly should not have to fear a 
compromise, or more aptly, a compromised, verdict. 
An equally destructive problem, however, is the punishment of the 
guilty.  Is any amount of justice better than no justice?  Maybe not.  We 
simply should not be satisfied that a rapist is sentenced to three months 
in jail for reckless sex when he deserves many years for rape.  While 
appeasing the victim should not be the goal of the criminal law, the 
problem with this proposed statute can be revealed by one simple 
question:  will any victim feel that her rapist was caught, tried, and 
convicted for the tremendous evil that was done to her if the rapist gets 
three months in jail for reckless sex?  Will not the convictions for this 
crime undermine the very seriousness of acquaintance rapes?  In Kahan’s 
terminology, we must be wary that this legislation is not a gentle nudge, 
but rather a “sly wink” that reinforces the existing norm.141 
The authors deny this possibility.  They claim that their statute is a 
supplement to, and not a substitute for, acquaintance rape statutes.142  
They seek to analogize their statute to a DUI law, reasoning that “[i]f 
most people do not conflate a DUI conviction with a manslaughter 
conviction, people need not conflate a conviction for reckless sex with a 
rape conviction.”143  The analogy fails.  Lawmakers did not enact DUI 
laws because prosecutors were failing to pursue manslaughter cases or 
because juries were not convicting.  Rather, DUI laws criminalize an 
inchoate act — by driving intoxicated, one takes the risk that one might 
kill another person.  In contrast, reckless sexual conduct cannot be an 
inchoate form of acquaintance rape because both crimes require the very 
 
 140 See FEINBERG, supra note 63, at 7-10 (discussing idea of “liberty-limiting principle”). 
 141 Kahan, supra note 133, at 624 (“[I]t is also possible that ‘indecent assault’ statutes, 
too, will end up reinforcing the ‘no sometimes means yes’ norm.  Critics argue that these 
statutes, precisely because they grade nonforcible, nonconsensual sex so much less severely 
than rape, are likely to corroborate the conviction that such behavior is not really worthy of 
criminal punishment at all.  This anxiety points up a general implementation problem for 
the ‘gentle nudges’ strategy.  That strategy implies that lawmakers should favor less 
condemnatory policies over more condemnatory ones in order to avoid triggering the ‘hard 
shove’ dynamic.  But policies that are only weakly condemnatory can be seen as signaling 
that the underlying conduct isn’t genuinely worthy of condemnation, an inference that is 
likely to reinforce itself insofar as moral appraisals are shaped by social influence.”). 
 142 Ayers & Baker, supra note 2, at 655 (“Reckless sexual conduct should not be 
presented as a substitute for rape.”). 
 143 Id. 
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same sexual act. 
The authors want to eat their cake and have it too.  They want to claim 
that this statute is necessary to convict acquaintance rapists and still 
claim that it punishes a “separate” crime of reckless sex.144  But this 
separate crime is not separate at all.  Its aim is to offer a lesser alternative 
to a rape conviction in the hopes that the jury will convict. 
Ultimately, what effect convictions for reckless sexual conduct will 
have on our perception of acquaintance rape is an empirical question.  
The problem is that we cannot afford a failed experiment.  Date rape has 
entered the public consciousness.  It is the subject of everything from 
freshman dorm meetings to afternoon soap operas.  While criminalizing 
“reckless sexual conduct” might unstick the norm, it could have the 
opposite effect, an effect that could undermine this progress. 
CONCLUSION 
In their conclusion, Ayers and Baker note that some readers may 
believe they have created a “thaumatrope,” “which by blending these 
two policy objectives somehow tricks the reader into seeing a whole that 
is greater than its parts.”145  I believe that the authors have missed the 
force of the objection.  It is not simply the case that Ayres and Baker have 
created a spinning toy that, through an optical illusion, combines a 
picture of a bird and a picture of a cage into a single image — a bird in a 
cage.  The optical illusion here is far more troubling:  they seek to 
combine two incomplete images and pretend they have a coherent 
whole, when what they actually have is just two images with a lot of 
holes.  They seek to show us a picture of a bird without wings, spin the 
toy and show us wings, and pretend their image can fly.  It cannot. 
The most incoherent aspect of the authors’ proposal is their view of 
consent.  The authors offer it as an affirmative defense, and they place 
the burden of proving consent on the defendant.  Of course, as described 
above, such an action will have a significant impact on acquaintance 
rape.  Because the contested issue in acquaintance rape prosecutions is 
consent, placing the burden on the defendant will ensure a greater 
number of convictions.  But, as seen above, and as the authors note, there 
is a significant problem with such an allocation — it is unconstitutional. 
 
 144 Compare id. at 638 (“[T]he criminalization of reckless sexual conduct is likely to 
reduce the problem of acquaintance rapists going completely unpunished.”), with id. at 660 
(“The crime of reckless sexual conduct is not about punishing nonconsensual sex . . . .”). 
 145 Id. at 665. 
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To fill this gap, the authors offer their second rationale:  public health.  
If consent is a defense to the public health rationale, then the authors 
claim that they can justify allocating the burden to the defendant.  The 
problem, however, is that with regard to this rationale, they cannot 
justify having a consent defense at all.  If a woman consents to the risk of 
being infected, she increases the risk that others will become infected in 
the future.  Her consent is utterly irrelevant to the health of the public.  
In fact, she increases the chance of potential harm. 
The woman’s consent also does not in any way diminish the man’s 
culpability.  One may not risk hurting other people for consensual sex.  
Here, if consent is a defense to the public health rationale under an 
entrapment or irresistible impulse analogy, the offer of consensual 
unprotected sex is an excuse to the risking harm of harm to others.  The 
criminal law has never recognized such a defense nor should it. 
In summary, consent has no place in this proposal if the aim is to 
protect the public health.  Consent is properly part of a rape statute (or 
any other proposal aimed at protecting the woman), but the burden 
there must lie with the prosecution.  The middle ground struck by the 
authors — offering consent as an affirmative defense that the defendant 
must prove — does not resolve either problem.  It is both conceptually 
confused and constitutionally unsound.  This bird cannot fly. 
 
With the best of intentions, Ayres and Baker propose the crime of 
reckless sexual conduct to address the ills of STDs and acquaintance 
rape.  Both goals, however, cannot be achieved with this one proposed 
statute, and with respect to both aims, the proposal requires significant 
reform.  The STD legislation is overbroad and thus criminalizes morally 
innocent behavior, a result that is not only contrary to the presumption 
of liberty in a free society but also may undermine the moral force of the 
criminal law.  Additionally, by offering a defense when conduct is 
consensual, the proposal excuses the morally guilty and legislates a view 
of excuse that runs contrary to our bedrock assumptions about criminal 
responsibility.  Punishing the innocent and excusing the guilty are 
socially destructive actions, and the authors proceed with too little 
caution. 
The authors’ attempt at rape reform is also problematic.  Once again, 
the proposed statute criminalizes innocent behavior, and worse still, it 
unconstitutionally places the burden of proving an essential element on 
the defendant.  Moreover, even the punishment of the guilty is 
problematic under this proposed statute.  The proposal offers a poor 
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proxy to real rape reform and ignores the fact that those culpable 
individuals who truly are acquaintance rapists deserve significant 
punishment, not a mere three months in jail.  Slight punishments may 
gradually affect the norm so that our society becomes more willing to 
punish acquaintance rape, but such punishments may also reinforce the 
view that acquaintance rapes are not real rapes.  Thus, with no empirical 
data suggesting that the chance of the former effect outweighs the 
danger of the latter, it is simply imprudent to proceed.  This is the time 
for rape reform.  But we should not be reckless about it. 
